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I Introduction
Immigration law touches on the lives of many. It directly involves real people, their families, and their futures. While immigration is an area of law intimately connected with human rights, and the humanitarian considerations and international obligations that guide those rights, it is also the direct product of the State's sovereign right to control its borders. This is explicitly recognised in the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act): "The purpose of this Act is to manage immigration in a way that balances the national interest, as determined by the Crown, and the rights of individuals." 1 As a result, "migration control is one of the few remaining areas where State executive authority can, under the guise of State sovereignty, enjoy almost unbridled power to favour individuals for entry into its territory."
2 One manifestation of this broad power is the use of "absolute discretion" in the Act. "Absolute discretion" is essentially an extension of an immigration officer's discretionary powers, permitting them to make some decisions without providing any reasons for those decisions. Understandably, the provision of "absolute discretion" has attracted the attention of academics, especially within the deportation framework where the use of "absolute discretion" may result in the person being forced to leave their life in New Zealand. Given this and the humanitarian considerations the deportation process may raise, any use of "absolute discretion" in this context should be in accordance with fair processes and subject to sufficient accountability mechanisms. Yet, the lack of reasons required for decisions made under "absolute discretion"
and the subsequent reluctance of the courts to undertake anything more than a Wednesbury 4 level of reasonableness review has attracted criticism from academics, worried about the potential for arbitrary decision making and the avoidance of New Zealand's international obligations. (2012) 43 VUWLR 423 at 425. 3 Immigration Act 2009, s 11. 4 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). 5 New Zealand's international obligations arise from treaties New Zealand has entered into but has not fully incorporated into the domestic legal system.
Many have called for a higher intensity of judicial review for such decisions, given that human rights are often at the centre of them. 6 However, discretion in the modern administrative state exists in an environment of operations manuals, internal instructions and an ever growing "culture of justification" 7 to protect against both actual and perceived arbitrariness in decision making and to provide legitimacy for decisions made with discretion. Further, appeal rights for deportation decisions have been created in the Act and the Ombudsman exists as an independent body that may hear complaints and scrutinise administrative decisions, including immigration decisions. Therefore, while the availability of judicial review may have been limited by the provision of "absolute discretion" to the immigration officer for some decisions, whether this opens the door for arbitrary decision making and the avoidance of New Zealand's international obligations depends on broader considerations.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the accountability mechanisms that exist in respect of deportation decisions, and determine whether the use of "absolute discretion" in certain sections is an acceptable provision of power, or an invitation for arbitrary decision making.
The sections that will be considered are ss 61 and 177 of the Act. These sections represent the most significant use of "absolute discretion" in the Act, essentially allowing the decision maker to stop deportation. Part II of this paper will briefly introduce the concept of "absolute discretion" and how it arises in the deportation context. Part III will examine the accountability mechanisms that exist within the deportation framework, with a specific focus on those accountability mechanisms that may react to the use of "absolute discretion". First I will look at the Immigration and Protection Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction and how they operate to promote good, fair and accountable deportation and "absolute discretion" decisions. I conclude that these external and formal accountability forums provide weak legal accountability for s 61 and s 177 decisions. Second, I consider the availability to the Ombudsman to provide accountability, concluding that the institution offers strong accountability for s 61 decisions. However, it appears to provide minimal accountability for s 177 decisions. Finally, I look more broadly at the role the media, question time, the Auditor General and soft law may play in ensuring good and reasoned decision making. Part IV concludes that the use of "absolute discretion" in s 61 appears to be adequately safeguarded, 6 Hanna Wilburg "Administrative Law (2016 triennial review of NZ developments) " [2016] NZ L Rev 571 at 594 and 597; Doug Tennent "Absolute Discretion in Immigration" [2012] NZLJ 144 at 149; Jessica BirdsallDay "Section 177 of the Immigration Act" [2013] NZLJ 230 at 232. 7 Michael Taggart "Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury" [2008] NZ L Rev 423 at 461.
particularly through the watchful eye of the Ombudsman and the use of internal instructions.
However, s 177 of the Act may permit arbitrary decision making and allow Immigration New
Zealand to avoid compliance with New Zealand's international obligations. A higher intensity of judicial review for s 177 decisions and the creation of internal instructions for immigration officers making s 177 decisions will be considered as two ways of ensuring this broad discretion does not result in arbitrary decisions.
II "Absolute Discretion" Defined
Discretionary powers allow government officials to make decisions within defined parameters, as set by Parliament. 8 As it is unrealistic and undesirable for Parliament to legislate for every possible situation in which the administrative state and the individual interact, discretion is a necessary tool to ensure policy can be applied fairly and as intended to individual cases. 9 This is especially pertinent in the immigration context where sensitivity to individual circumstances is crucial to ensure a fair and just outcome. The application of strict legal rules, while providing certainty and transparency, would almost certainly create severe injustice and likely impinge on human rights if applied in deportation cases.
It is broadly accepted that discretionary powers are not wholly good or wholly bad; it depends on the context in which they are used and the parameters that exist to confine them.
10
Unbounded discretion risks decisions being made that are, or are perceived to be, arbitrary.
Therefore, even when the decision maker has wide discretionary powers, such as "absolute discretion", they must be accountable in some manner, 11 to ensure just and fair decisions are being made in accordance with good administrative practice. 12 This ensures that public law values such as natural justice and the rule of law are being upheld.
Both "discretion" and "absolute discretion" are used in the Act. Decisions made under "discretion", such as the issuing of visas, 13 may be applied for and the applicant may request reasons for any rejected application.
14 The same is not true for decisions made under "absolute discretion". Absolute discretion is defined in s 11 of the Act:
11 Meaning of absolute discretion of the decision maker
(1) If a provision of this Act provides that a matter or decision is in the absolute discretion of the decision maker concerned, it means that-(a) the matter or decision may not be applied for; and (b) if a person purports to apply for the matter or decision, there is no obligation on the decision maker to-(i) consider the purported application; or
(ii) inquire into the circumstances of the person or any other person; or (iii) make any further inquiries in respect of any information provided by, or in respect of, the person or any other person; and (c) whether the purported application is considered or not,-(i) the decision maker is not obliged to give reasons for any decision relating to the purported application, other than the reason that this section applies; and (ia) privacy principle 6 (which relates to access to personal information and is set out in section 6 of the Privacy Act 1993) does not apply to any reasons for any decision relating to the purported application; and
(ii) section 27 of this Act and section 23 of the Official Information Act 1982 do not apply in respect of the purported application.
A decision that is in the "absolute discretion" of the decision maker is one that may not be applied for. 15 However, while there is no legal right for a person to apply for such a decision, the only way such a decision will come before the decision maker is if the deportee provides personal information that triggers the possibility of such a decision being made. 16 It is likely this is to ensure that Parliament's intention is clear; the sections in which the decision maker has "absolute discretion" are not intended to confer strong legal rights to the claimant, they are to provide a backstop to deal with exceptional cases. 17 "Absolute discretion" is often touted as being for the benefit of the applicant. It allows justice to be done in cases where the applicant would not otherwise have any right to such a decision. Wide discretionary powers have long 14 Section 27. 15 Section 11(1)(a). 16 Twenty-six sections in the Act purport to confer "absolute discretion" to the decision maker.
The focus of this paper will be the use of "absolute discretion" in ss 61 and 177 of the Act. that has been served on a person who is unlawfully in New Zealand. A person is unlawfully in New Zealand if they do not hold a visa under the Act, either due to expiry or cancellation, or they were never granted entry into New Zealand. 24 The use of "absolute discretion" in these two sections is arguably the most significant in terms of the power they provide to the decision maker, 25 and these sections have been subject to the most attention in the courts. For these reasons, ss 61 and 177 will be the focus of this paper. Further, analysing these two provisions together will show that the provision of "absolute discretion" isn't an inherently troublesome use of executive power, provided there are sufficient accountability mechanisms and guidelines in place. This appears to be the case for s 61. In comparison, the use of "absolute discretion" in s 177 is troubling.
To properly analyse the use of "absolute discretion" in the Act and whether it is appropriate, it is first necessary to understand the broader context in which such decisions may arise, that is, the context in which the Minister of Immigration or an immigration officer is conferred this broad power. The diagram below sets out the deportation process if a person is unlawfully in New Zealand, the appeal and review rights available to the person, and when the Minister of
Immigration or an immigration officer may use their "absolute discretion" to prevent deportation. As can be seen, ss 61 and 177 are supplementary powers. They exist alongside the main framework for deportation, essentially acting as a safety net to ensure that, in cases where it is fair and just to do so, the potential deportee may lawfully remain in New Zealand. 26 Section 61 may be used when the person is liable for deportation, but has not yet been served a deportation order. Section 177 may be used once a deportation order has been served. There are no formal appeal rights from s 61 or s 177 decisions, likely a result of their status as supplementary powers. However, they may be judicially reviewed and s 61 decisions may be subject to a complaint to the Ombudsman. 27 As well as these formal accountability forums, the diagram below also identifies other more informal forums, that may ensure the decision maker is making good and reasoned decisions, even when they have "absolute discretion". These are the media and question time. The use of internal instructions, while not an accountability mechanism, will also be considered as a means of guiding the use of "absolute discretion".
24 Immigration Act, s 9. 25 Wilburg, above n 6, at 594 and Immigration and Refugee Law, above n 12, at 602. 26 Immigration and Refugee Law, above n 12, at 124. 27 At 126.
The following analysis will introduce each proposed accountability mechanism and analyse how it works to provide or encourage accountability for decisions made under ss 61 and 177. Perhaps it is more acceptable to have minimal accountability for decisions made under exceptional provisions, where the decision is seen as a privilege, rather than a right. This idea appears to be part of the justification for the use of "absolute discretion" in these circumstances.
III
The government did not want those who did not use the processes provided by the Act as intended to be put a better position than those who engaged with the system. 40 However, if an accessible, fair and effective formal appeal system is to justify less accountability for exceptional provisions such as ss 61 and 177, we would want to be sure that the appeal process provided by the Act is in fact accessible, fair and effective. Whether this is the case may be debated.
It is difficult to appeal or review a Tribunal decision. For both, leave is required and the applicant must show that their case gives rise to a question of law that is of general or public importance (or any other reason). 41 The courts have considered that these leave requirements were intended to limit a claimant's ability to appeal in immigration cases and have been may be more difficult to say that the existence of a formal appeal system justifies the use of "absolute discretion", as the appeal rights provided have not been effective.
Therefore, it appears that the existence of a formal appeal system can not justify minimal direct accountability mechanisms for ss 61 and 177. While the Tribunal is available to access, in effect, the same decision a claimant may seek through ss 61 or 177, there must still be effective accountability mechanisms in place to ensure s 61 and s 177 decisions are being made in accordance with good administrative practice. The effectiveness of judicial review, another form of legal accountability and one that provides direct accountability for ss 61 and 177 decisions will be considered next.
B Judicial Review
A person who is unhappy with a s 61 or s 177 decision may apply for judicial review of the decision. Though, as will be seen, this provides weak accountability in the context of "absolute 42 Immigration and Refugee Law, above n 12, at 415. 43 Wilburg, above n 6, at 594. and that the courts will read down any attempt to oust their jurisdiction by construing legislation in a manner that still allows them to hold public officials to account. 52 However, while the use of "absolute discretion" may not represent a privative clause in the orthodox sense, 53 it has been relatively successful in limiting the ability of the court to intervene and appears to operate in a similar way to an orthodox privative clause. This has led some academics to dub such clauses "modern privative provisions".
54
This section of the paper will consider how the courts have approached their role in reviewing decisions made with "absolute discretion" and the extent to which they have been willing to interfere with such decisions. As will be seen, the minimal obligation on the immigration officer to inform the court, the difficulty with the court questioning the immigration officer's 53 Traditional privative clauses attempt to oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts through express words, for example, "The decision may not be called in to question in any court of law." The intended effect of such clauses is to allow administrative decision makers to conclusively determine questions of law. Such clauses are not welcomed by the courts, who apply a strong presumption in favour of judicial review when interpreting such clauses. For a more detailed discussion on privative clauses, see Philip A Joseph, above n 50, at 905. 54 JG Pemberton "The Judicial Approach to Privative Provisions in New Zealand" (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, University of Otago, 2014).
conduct, and the resulting difficulty in passing any judgment on the conduct means that the use of judicial review as an accountability mechanism is weak for s 61 and s 177 decisions.
Section 177
The broad sweep of case law concerning how the courts may and do review decisions made under "absolute discretion" has been in response to s 177 decisions. Section 177 provides:
177 Deportation order may be cancelled
(1) An immigration officer may, in his or her absolute discretion, cancel a deportation order served on a person to whom section 154 applies.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) While s 177(1) provides that the decision is in the "absolute discretion" of the immigration officer, s 177(2) appears to immediately circumscribe this discretion by providing that the officer must consider cancelling the order if the prospective deportee provides the officer with information concerning their circumstances that is relevant to New Zealand's international obligations. This is the only limitation though. Section 177 goes on to affirm that provided the officer has regard to "any relevant international obligations", the decision to cancel is in their "absolute discretion" and they may make any decision they think fit. The immigration officer is under no obligation to apply any test, they are under no obligation to inquire into the circumstances of the deportee or any other person and they are under no obligation to give any reasons for any decision. Therefore, while s 177 is designed to allow humanitarian factors to be taken into account through the consideration of international obligations, the requirements on the immigration officer making the decision are not onerous. In comparison to a humanitarian appeal, which requires the Tribunal to cancel liability for deportation if exceptional circumstances exist that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be deported, 56 the immigration officer is merely required by s 177 to consider any international obligations they deem relevant. The culmination of the above is that it is difficult for the courts to conduct any sort of review of the decision making process. Therefore, judicial review appears to provide limited legal accountability for s 177 decisions.
Ewebyi v Parr is the only case in which a s 177 decision has been successfully judicially reviewed and this was due to the immigration officer's failure to record the international obligations that had been considered and the personal circumstances that had triggered the consideration, not because the resulting decision was Wednesbury unreasonable.
(a) No obligation to consider a s 177 application
The above discussion has focused on how the courts have interpreted their role in reviewing a s 177 decision in circumstances where the officer has considered a purported application. As above, the definition of "absolute discretion" explicitly states that "there is no obligation on the decision maker to consider the purported application" and "whether the purported Given the high threshold for a humanitarian appeal in the Act, 92 the result of such a situation is likely to be that New Zealand is in breach of its international obligations.
Nevertheless, the wording of s 177 and the intention expressed in the Minister of Immigration's speech convey that Parliament's intention was to reduce obligations on the immigration officer and ensure the basis for judicial review of any decision is limited. This has been effective, with judicial review representing a weak accountability mechanism for s 177 decisions. Section 61 will be examined next. While s 61 does not share the same legislative history, it appears "absolute discretion" has still been successful in reducing the effectiveness of the courts as an accountability mechanism for such decisions.
Section 61
Section 61 (2) A decision to grant a visa under subsection (1) 
Effectiveness as an accountability mechanism
In substance, the use of "absolute discretion" significantly reduces the ability of the courts to review s 61 and s 177 decisions. While both ss 61 and 177 give the impression of being a positive exception to the deportation regime, directing the decision maker to take into account any relevant considerations and indicating these should or must include New Zealand's international obligations, the lack of any ability to check what the decision maker has taken into account, or how, significantly undermines this. Without a requirement to provide reasons, the courts cannot confer any obligation on the Minister of Immigration or the immigration officer to explain and justify their conduct, nor is there any ability to question them. As a result, the courts provide little scope for passing judgment and there are unlikely to be consequences.
This, together with the lack of any appeal rights to the Tribunal, means there is weak legal accountability for s 61 and s 177 decisions. Given the humanitarian concerns at the heart these decisions, the lack of legal accountability may be concerning. shift away from relying on the courts to check executive power. 119 Other institutions and practices are increasingly recognised as providing effective external and internal controls on administrative decision making. These will be considered below.
C The Ombudsman
The Ombudsman was introduced as a means of reviewing administrative behaviour and process, alongside the more formal judicial review process or Parliament. 120 concerns about the circular, specifically, that IAC 11/10 failed to comply with good administrative practice and that it opened the door to arbitrary decision making. 137 The letter also expressed concern that the circular did not explicitly require any particular factors to be considered in making the decision, especially relevant international obligations. Upon investigation, the Ombudsman wrote to Immigration New Zealand suggesting changes to the IAC 11/10. 138 These changes, for the most part, were implemented a year later. 139 It is worth noting that the controversial IAC 11/10 also attracted much criticism from the media and the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties. 140 No doubt this public outcry contributed to Immigration New Zealand amending the circular. Reasons must now be recorded, for the purpose of internal use, and the new circular lists relevant factors that should be considered by the s 61 decision maker. 141 Though, the circular still fails to note that New Zealand's international obligations represent mandatory considerations that must be taken into account in administrative decision making. 142 It merely states that the decision maker may take them into account. Issues that that may arise as a result of this are likely mitigated by the close attention the Ombudsman and other groups such as the Law Society pay to s 61 decision making and their insistence that international obligations must be taken into account.
143
Therefore, the Ombudsman appears to operate as a robust accountability mechanism for s 61 decisions.
Effectiveness as an accountability mechanism
The Ombudsman can be considered an effective accountability mechanism as it protects against the abuse of the immigration officer's broad powers by publically disapproving of the decision or process and recommending redress. 144 If a s 61 request has been declined, the requestor may complain to the Ombudsman, who will investigate the complaint if necessary.
The Ombudsman can also be seen as effective as it forces Immigration New Zealand to reflect on their practices for making s 61 decisions and develop them in a way that will produce better, more robust outcomes. 145 Often, the Ombudsman will recommend a systemic change in the Department to prevent maladministration occurring in the future. 146 While the Ombudsman has no ability to make binding recommendations or formally sanction the decision maker, the threat of investigation and public disapproval often acts as an informal consequence and recommendations are usually complied with. 147 Government departments and their responsible ministers do not want to be seen by the public and the rest of government as being poorly run and dismissive of external review as this may lead to political and professional consequences for those involved. Therefore, the possibility of an Ombudsman investigation is also likely to incentivise good decision making in the first place. Overall, the Ombudsman as an accountability mechanism for s 61 decisions can be considered adequate. However, the Ombudsman does not appear to provide any accountability for s 177 decisions.
D The Media and Question Time
The media and question time also provide accountability for administrative decision making, though they represent less direct accountability mechanisms for ss 61 and 177. They work to 143 At 611. 144 In other words, it is an effective accountability mechanism from the constitutional perspective. See Bovens, above n 28, at 463. 145 This shows the Ombudsman is effective as an accountability mechanism from the learning perspective. See Bovens, above n 28, at 463. 
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This shows both the influence of the media and the consequences of the double standard that has effectively been created by the rejection of any requirement to apply the humanitarian test when considering a s 177 decision, as discussed above. 151 In 2010, when the couple were served with deportation orders, the only avenue they had to challenge the orders was through appealing to an immigration officer and hoping they would exercise their discretion. The formal appeal rights had expired by that point. On the Associate Minister's initial review of the case, she did not consider the Ram's circumstances outweighed the interest in maintaining their deportation orders. 152 Yet the Tribunal, applying the humanitarian test, found that those same circumstances did justify the Ram's being able to remain in New Zealand. While the media may play an important role in ensuring accountability of executive action, its strength in the deportation context seems less secure, at least for individual decisions. To be effective, it requires a story that will grab the attention of the public, such as the above. This is likely to be influenced by what else is in the news cycle at the time. This means the media may be difficult to trigger as an accountability mechanism. Further, given its informal nature, there is no guaranteed response or consequences. The decision maker may change their mind, but there is nothing obliging them to do so. However, the threat of media coverage and public outcry may incentivise good decision making in the first place. Immigration New Zealand does not want to be seen by the public as abusing their power or failing to use their power in circumstances that deserve it. Therefore, while the media may be difficult to trigger as an accountability mechanism and have uncertain impact, it still provides some level of accountability for s 61 and s 177 decisions.
Question time may also promote good administrative decision making by Immigration New
Zealand through the questioning of decisions that do not appear to have followed good process. Overall, while the watchful eye of the media and question time surely encourage good administrative decision making, they do not provide strong consequences for the decision maker and triggering them may be difficult. Given that s 61 and s 177 decisions often have humanitarian concerns at stake, and in the case of s 177 decisions, they are the last step before a deportation order is executed, they cannot be considered sufficient accountability mechanisms alone to protect against arbitrary decisions being made. At the very least, they require the public or other members of Parliament to be informed and care. Given the different factors that affect this, both the media and question time represent weak accountability mechanisms.
E The Auditor General
The Auditor General may also act as a forum by which Immigration New Zealand decision makers may be held to account. The Auditor General is an independent body that may audit or inquire into public entities to ensure they are operating, and accountable for their operations, in accordance with Parliament's intent. 156 Often the quality and legitimacy of decision making comes down to the culture of the department in which the decisions are being made. closely watched, the lack of direct accountability it provides for individual decisions means it cannot be considered a sufficient accountability mechanism alone for decisions made under "absolute discretion".
F Soft Law
There are limits of using a narrow definition to assess the accountability of decisions made under "absolute discretion". The narrow definition risks overlooking other factors that ensure that administrative officials are making good administrative decisions but do not meet the narrow definition of accountability. For example, the use of soft law.
The term "soft law" is used to encapsulate administrative processes and guidelines for decision making, such as internal circulars and policy notes. 164 Soft law helps to increase transparency and integrity in decision making. As mentioned above, Immigration New Zealand publish
Internal Administration Circulars to guide staff decision making in particular contexts. The current circular for s 61 requires decision makers to record their reasons for any decision and provides guidance as to various factors that should be taken into account. The final part of this paper will conclude that while there appear to be sufficient safeguards in place to protect against the making of arbitrary decisions under s 61, the same does not appear to be true for s 177. Given the lack of current accountability mechanisms that exist for s 177 decisions, options for improving and protecting against arbitrary decision making in s 177
decisions will be considered. These are a higher intensity of judicial review and a requirement for immigration officers to record reasons when making a s 177 decision.
IV Safeguarding Against Arbitrary Decisions
Section 61 decisions appear to be sufficiently accountable and the section is unlikely to result in the making of arbitrary decisions. The Minister of Immigration (or their delegate) may have "absolute discretion" when making a s 61 decision, but that discretion is subject to adequate accountability mechanisms. While there is no right to appeal a s 61 decision to the Tribunal, and the ability of the courts to review the decision is limited, a s 61 decision is guided by internal instructions, and complaints may be made to the Ombudsman. The internal instructions require reasons to be recorded and provides a list of considerations that the decision maker should take into account when making the decision. This gives the applicant some idea of how the decision will be made and it encourages good, reasoned decision making on the decision makers part. The potential for the Ombudsman to investigate is likely to encourage decision makers to make good decisions as well. The Ombudsman may also respond to individual complaints about s 61 decisions, meaning they also represent a potential ex post facto control on such decisions. This arguably justifies the limited ability of the courts to review s 61 decisions.
Given these safeguards, it can be concluded that the use of "absolute discretion" in s 61 does not amount to an invitation to make arbitrary decisions. Some may argue that the limited ability of the courts to review nevertheless erodes the legitimacy of the decisions due the common perception of the courts as the primary protector against executive abuses of power, but these days recourse to the courts is often not a person's primary means of challenging administrative decisions. 166 The close attention being paid to s 61 decisions by the Ombudsman, the Auditor General, the media and groups such as the New Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand given the humanitarian considerations at stake, this cannot be considered a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary decision making.
Therefore, it appears s 177 suffers from accountability deficits. Without any reasons nor any way of knowing how the immigration officer considered the relevant international obligations, there exists a risk that this provision may be used to scape goat New Zealand's international obligations and to enforce deportation orders against people, and consequently their families, when humanitarian reasons exist for allowing them to stay. The existence of a formal appeal system and the difficulty for immigration officers to undertake a complex analysis at the last stage before deportation is often cited as the justification for restricting claimant's rights in regard to s 177 decisions. 167 But if the decision has already been subject to a humanitarian appeal before the Tribunal, then it should be easy for the immigration officer to show why the s 177 application has been denied, drawing on the findings of the Tribunal. If the decision has not been subject to an appeal before the Tribunal, then surely natural justice and good administrative practice require more than just a list of the international obligations that have been considered and no real ability to have the decision reviewed.
Some academics have suggested a higher intensity of review is possible and desirable for s 177
decisions. These arguments will be considered and supported below. Following the consideration of how judicial review may and should be used as a safeguard against arbitrary decision making, the use of soft law and a requirement to record reasons will be considered.
A A Higher Intensity of Judicial Review
As mentioned above, Singh is the most recent Court of Appeal judgment to consider the intensity of review available for s 177 decisions. 168 It affirmed that while officers are obliged to consider relevant international obligations, they are not obliged to give effect to them in any particular way, or even at all. 169 As a result, unless the officer has failed to comply with the mandatory recording obligation in s 177(5), it is difficult to see how decision could ever be successfully reviewed. Since Tavita, the Immigration Act has been amended to explicitly require New Zealand's international obligations be considered in decision making. However, arguably the use of "absolute discretion" undermines this. The case law shows that while s 177 explicitly requires international obligations to be considered, there is no way of ensuring relevant international obligations were given appropriate weight; the officer may give no effect to them at all with no consequence. Therefore, perhaps a higher intensity of judicial review is necessary and an appropriate way to ensure New Zealand is upholding its international obligations. Surely even the broad legislative provision of "absolute discretion" may be subject to the presumption of consistency with international law. There has been increasing acceptance that wide discretionary powers are still able to be read consistently with international obligations. Though, the application and effect of the presumption of consistency will depend on the facts of each case and the strength of the relevant international obligations.
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It should be mentioned that in refusing leave to appeal in Singh, the Supreme Court noted that in a case with appropriate facts, there may be issues about the interpretation of s 177 that would meet the general or public importance threshold. 186 Therefore, while the weight of case law appears to favour Wednesbury unreasonableness, there is still scope and support for a Supreme
Court decision to apply a higher intensity of review. This would ensure that in situations where the appeal rights are not used, the claimant has a means of ensuring that proper considerations are taken into account. Given the lack of other effective accountability mechanisms for s 177 decisions, and the humanitarian considerations at stake, stronger legal accountability is desirable. [2012] NZ L Rev 465 at 469. 184 Wilburg, above n 6, at 597. 185 "Tavita and All That", above n 106, at 78. 186 Singh, above n 60, at [4] .
B The Use of Soft Law
The use of soft law may be another means of safeguarding against arbitrary s 177 decisions.
Producing an Internal Administration Circular to guide the decision making process for s 177
would increase transparency and promote consistent decision making. Internal instructions are flexible and easily changed, and as has been seen in the context of s 61, they do not undermine "absolute discretion". A failure on the decision maker's behalf to follow internal instructions is not legally enforceable by the applicant. 187 While claimants would still have no right to reasons, requiring the immigration officer to record their reasons for any s 177 decision they make, whether positive or negative, is recommended. Reasons are a fundamental aspect of an accountable decision. Without a written record, there is no means of assessing whether a decision is fair and reasonable. 188 "Absolute discretion" can not mean that the immigration officer does not need to have reasons. That would be the very definition of an arbitrary power. 189 Therefore merely requiring them to record those reasons should not be onerous. A record of reasons would also provide a basis upon which an internal review may occur.
Knowing that s 177 decisions may be subject to internal review is likely to increase public confidence in Immigration New Zealand's decision making process.
Though, it may be recalled that Parliament's explicit intention when creating s 177 was to remove any requirement to apply any test, of any sort. 190 The danger with providing internal instructions that indicate relevant considerations that may or should be taken into account is that they may end up being strictly applied or creating tunnel vision. It may create a tick box type mentality and the decision maker may be less likely to adapt to the particular circumstances and ensure fair outcomes are reached in every situation. Given this, Immigration New Zealand would have to be cautious in developing guidance to ensure it is not prescriptive.
At the very least, a requirement to record reasons for s 177 would be a step in the right direction for ensuring an accountable Immigration New Zealand.
V Conclusion
The provision of "absolute discretion" to the of discretion within administrative decision making, it must be exercised within the constraints of public law values and any guidance provided. While the explicit rejection of any requirement to provide reasons for decisions may invite fear of arbitrary decision making, sufficient guidance and accountability mechanisms can ensure "absolute discretion" is used as intended.
That is, to achieve fairness in situations where the deportation framework in the Act would otherwise create injustice and impinge on people's human rights. The existence of the Ombudsman, the media, question time, the Auditor General, the Law Society and to a limited extent, the courts, watching over decision makers and actively promoting good administrative decision making appears to protect against this. At least for s 61 that is.
The lack of guidance provided for s 177 decisions and the lack of any formal accountability mechanisms for these decisions is problematic. While immigration law is a direct product of the State's sovereign right to control its borders, this surely cannot justify the use of "absolute discretion" in a manner that allows immigration officers to act in breach of New Zealand's international obligations. If New Zealand is to continue to hold itself out as a crusader for human rights, an exemplar of modern democracy and a good international citizen, increased accountability for s 177 decisions is necessary. 
Word Count

